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 “PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS” IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY 
PROGRAMS:  MUST THE COURT DEFER TO THE 
UNIVERSITY ON FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS? 
Emily Deyring* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free speech on college campuses has become a contentious issue with 
some public universities and state legislatures recently implementing 
policies and guidelines that attempt to prevent “violent, unruly disruptions” 
on campus.1  Student groups have made their way to federal court in thus-
far-unsuccessful claims that universities violated the First Amendment2 by 
closing the campus to controversial outside speakers, such as former 
Breitbart senior editor Milo Yiannopoulos.3 
A public university has the right to make its platforms unavailable to 
speakers who do not further the institution’s goals.4  Nonetheless, it remains 
unclear exactly how far beyond its physical boundaries the public university 
may reach into its students’ speech without violating their constitutional 
rights.5  Furthermore, circuit courts and state courts have struggled to apply 
the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood School District v. 
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 1  Jeremy W. Peters, In Name of Free Speech, States Crack Down on Campus Protests, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/us/politics/campus-
speech-protests.html. 
 2  U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . .”) 
 3  Young America’s Found. v. Napolitano, No. 17-cv-02255-MMC, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70108 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018).  See also Robles v. In the Name of Humanity, We 
Refuse to Accept a Fascist Am., No. 17-cv-04864-CW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93819 (N.D. 
Cal. June 4, 2018) (denying plaintiff’s claim that the University of California Berkeley 
violated her First Amendment rights by willfully withholding police protection at a 
Yiannopoulos event). 
 4  See Catherine J. Ross, Campus Discourse and Democracy: Free Speech Principles 
Provide Sound Guidance Even After the Tumult of 2017, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 801 
(2018). 
 5  See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. 
L. REV. 1801, 1834 (2017). 
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Kuhlmeier6 decision—whether the university’s censorship of its students’ 
speech is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”7  
Particularly troubling is a string of cases involving “professional standards” 
at public universities.8  The Supreme Court has yet to form a test for deciding 
whether these public university programs can restrict students’ free speech 
rights off-campus under the guise of professional standards.9  For example, 
in 2012, Central Lakes College student Craig Keefe was expelled from a 
nursing program for making incendiary comments about his classmates and 
instructors on his Facebook page.10  Keefe sued the school for infringing his 
First Amendment right to free speech.11  In 2016, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Keefe v. Adams, found that the school did not infringe the 
student’s rights.12  The Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s 
Hazelwood standard that a school can constitutionally restrict student-
produced content if the restriction is “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”13 
 
 6  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 7  Id. at 273.  Compare Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. 
of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (citing Hazelwood to support deference to the 
university); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Hazelwood 
standard applies to a nursing student who made controversial statements about classmates on 
his Facebook page); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that Hazelwood is the appropriate standard when evaluating a challenge to a university’s 
acting class that required a student to speak offensive words in a script); Brown v. Li, 308 
F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood in a case involving a master’s thesis); Bishop 
v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood in a case involving challenge 
to university restrictions on professor’s classroom speech), with Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 
816, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e need not consider whether the principles of 
Hazelwood . . . apply with full force in a university setting—a question neither we  . . . nor 
the Supreme Court  . . . have definitively answered.”), and Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (Reinhardt, 
J., dissenting) (“Because the reasons underlying the . . . speech rights of high school youths 
do not apply in the adult world of college and graduate students . . . I cannot agree with . . . 
[the] conclusion that the First Amendment standard established in Hazelwood applies at the 
university level.”). 
 8  See, e.g., Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532; Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 
2015); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).  
 9  Clay Calvert, Professional Standards and the First Amendment in Higher Education: 
When Institutional Academic Freedom Collides with Student Speech Rights, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 611, 621 (2017) (quoting Professor Alan Chen, who stated that “the Supreme Court 
sporadically has made compelling statements about the importance of academic freedom, yet, 
it has been either unable or unwilling to develop a coherent framework for assessing the scope 
of constitutional academic freedom rights”).  See also Michael K. Park, Restricting 
Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality of Regulating Students’ Off-campus Online 
Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405, 427 (2016) (“Thus far the 
Supreme Court has never . . . provided any guidance as to whether school speech precedents 
apply with equal force in the university context.”). 
 10  Keefe, 840 F.3d at 525. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. at 533. 
 13  Id. at 531 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
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Some commentators have argued that Keefe is deeply flawed because 
it essentially declared that professional students sign away their First 
Amendment rights by enrolling in a “professional” program that holds 
students to a corresponding standard.14  Furthermore, other scholars have 
criticized Keefe because that case involved a nursing student’s speech off-
campus; Hazelwood, in contrast, examined high school students’ speech in a 
curricular setting on-campus (a student newspaper).15  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Hazelwood that public K-12 schools may constitutionally 
restrict student journalists, the American Society of News Editors and the 
Society of Professional Journalists have passed resolutions in support of 
legislation that they say would protect student publications from retaliation, 
such as defunding.16  The Supreme Court declined to review the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in Keefe,17 potentially eroding university students’ free 
speech protections off-campus. 
First Amendment scholar Professor Clay Calvert has proposed a four-
pronged test for courts in deciding whether a public university’s professional 
standard is constitutional.18  Calvert based this test off the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Oyama v. University of Hawaii, which upheld 
a student’s expulsion from a teaching program.19  While the test provides an 
improved framework for courts’ treatment of professional student speech 
off-campus, it leaves open too many opportunities for universities to burden 
student speech.  If the Supreme Court were to apply this test to recent cases, 
it would still infringe students’ First Amendment rights, causing grave 
consequences for the students’ careers and the industries in which they seek 
employment. 
 
 14  See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 9, at 613.  See also Lindsie Trego, Article, When a 
Student’s Speech Belongs to the University: Keefe, Hazelwood, and the Expanding Role of 
the Government Speech Doctrine on Campus, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98, 115–16 
(“Scholars have expressed concern that the government speech doctrine is quickly expanding 
and threatens to swallow the First Amendment, and the professional student speech doctrine 
is further evidence of this expansion.”). 
 15  See Kai Wahrmann-Harry, Note, The Next Step in Student Speech Analysis? How the 
Eighth Circuit Further Complicates the First Amendment Rights of University Students in 
Keefe v. Adams, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 442–44 (2018).   
 16  AM. SOC’Y OF NEWS EDITORS, RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWS EDITORS IN SUPPORT OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR STUDENT 
JOURNALISTS AND ADVISERS (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.spl/1333_asne_resolution_in_support_of_student_journali
sts_and_advisers_2016o.pdf; Society of Professional Journalists, Resolution in Support of 
Enhanced Protections for Student Journalists (2016), https://www.spj.org/res2016.asp#4.  
 17  Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017). 
 18  Calvert, supra note 9, at 648.  Under the four prongs of Calvert’s suggested test, a 
court must ensure that a public university’s enforcement of a professional standard does not 
violate a student’s right to free speech by evaluating the standard for precision, essentiality, 
contextuality, and proportionality. Id. 
 19  813 F.3d 850 (2015). 
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This Comment examines how courts adjudicate professionalism 
requirements as applied to public university student speech off-campus.  
Specifically, this Comment evaluates Calvert’s proposed test for evaluating 
the constitutionality of universities’ professional standard,20 arguing that the 
test is too deferential to the university’s judgment and could lead to 
numerous unforeseen consequences that would cause harm to students, 
especially those vulnerable to being marginalized.  Part II focuses on the 
history of free speech on- and off-campus.  Part III addresses the “legitimate 
pedagogical concern” standard and the role of the university in enforcing 
professional standards for credentialing professional programs.  Part IV 
critiques Professor Clay Calvert’s proposed four-pronged test for 
professional standards and suggests potential unforeseen adverse 
consequences that might arise if the Supreme Court were to adopt this 
analysis; Part IV also offers alternative considerations for scholars and jurists 
when evaluating professional standards cases through the lens of the First 
Amendment. 
II. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH ON- AND OFF-CAMPUS 
College campuses have long been venues of conflicting interests21 
between students’ First Amendment right to free speech and universities’ 
interest in fulfilling their educational goals.22  Beginning with The Civil 
Rights Cases23 in 1883, federal courts have laid a groundwork upon which 
to evaluate the university’s role as a state actor.  Public universities are 
considered state actors24 and are thus bound to uphold the Constitution.25  
The Supreme Court considers schools to be a part of the “marketplace of 
ideas” and has thus prohibited them from infringing speech based on the 
 
 20  Calvert, supra note 9, at 648. 
 21  Andrew Hartman, People Always Think Students Are Hostile to Speech. They Never 
Really Are., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/people-
always-think-students-are-hostile-to-speech-they-never-really-are/2018/03/15/cc53cc3a-
286c-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story.html?utm_term=.a8691f7a0b4b (“The college 
campus . . . has always been a breeding ground for protest.”).   
 22  See, e.g., IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 
386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We agree wholeheartedly that it is the University officials’ 
responsibility, even their obligation, to achieve the goals they have set.  On the other hand, a 
public university has many constitutionally permissible means to protect female and minority 
students.”). 
 23  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 24  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“All agree that . . . a public university, is a state actor . . . .”). 
 25  See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–24 (1961) (establishing 
that a private business acting in close relationship to the government is sufficient to be 
considered “state action”).  See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH 
ON CAMPUS 52–53 (2017). 
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viewpoints contained therein.26  Although courts have examined university-
level “professional standard” speech off-campus in a few cases,27 the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue of university student 
speech off-campus.28  This dearth of guidance leaves a sense of uncertainty 
among students and academic administrators, but also presents an 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to provide clarity. 
A. Free Speech and Public High Schools 
Through a string of cases, the Supreme Court has established clear First 
Amendment jurisprudence within non-secondary public schools.  In the 
context of public high school students’ speech on campus, Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District set forth a test allowing 
regulation of student speech by high school officials if the speech causes 
substantial disruption or materially interferes with the learning 
environment.29 
Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our 
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the 
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their 
obligations to the State. . . .  [Students] may not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.  In the 
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to 
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of 
expression of their views.30 
Tinker also made clear that while school officials may regulate student 
speech in limited circumstances of substantial disruption or material 
interference, students’ free speech rights extend beyond “carefully restricted 
circumstances,” such as classroom discussion:31  “[i]t can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”32  The question remains: How 
far and how high does the schoolhouse gate go? 
 
 
 26  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 71 (1983) (citing 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); accord Healy 
v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 27  See, e.g., Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 
N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
 28  Calvert, supra note 9, at 621. 
 29  393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 30  Id. at 511. 
 31  Id. at 513. (“We properly read [the Constitution] to permit reasonable regulation of 
speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.  But we do not confine the 
permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a 
pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.”). 
 32  Id. at 506. 
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Although Supreme Court cases following Tinker have applied the 
“substantial disruption and material interference” test to other situations 
involving students, these cases have generally been restricted to kindergarten 
through high school.33  Specifically, in 1986, the Court differentiated 
between students in public school and “adults in other settings”34 in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, when it held that a high school may 
discipline a student for having made an “offensively lewd and indecent 
speech” at a school assembly.35 
In 1988, the Court further refined its stance toward speech in high 
schools in Hazelwood, holding that “[a] school need not tolerate speech that 
is inconsistent with . . . its educational mission.”36  Although Hazelwood has 
been invoked in multiple cases involving student speech, the case arose from 
a high school newspaper’s activity.37  The Court was clear that restricting 
student speech activity is permissible regardless of where it occurs, provided 
that the expression can be considered part of the school’s curriculum.38  The 
Court in Hazelwood also emphasized that the decision stood as an exception 
to the Tinker standard, rather than as a revamped standard.39 This is crucial 
to note when examining cases where courts have applied both Hazelwood 
and Tinker to the university setting.  Some scholars have argued that 
Hazelwood applies to viewpoint-specific student speech because “schools 
have an interest in maintaining their own messaging as they carry out their 
educational function.”40 
The Court similarly invoked Fraser in Morse v. Frederick in 2007, 
when it held that it was constitutional for a high school to confiscate a 
 
 33  Meg Penrose, Sharing Stupid $h*t With Friends and Followers: The First Amendment 
Rights of College Athletes to Use Social Media, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 449, 477 
(2014). 
 34  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 35  Id. at 685. 
 36  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 37  Id. at 262. 
 38  Id. at 271 (explaining that [t]heatrical productions, and other expressive activities that 
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur 
of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not 
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.). 
 39  Id. at 272–73 (“[W]e conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining 
when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining 
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student 
expression.”). 
 40  Brad Dickens, Comment, Reclaiming Hazelwood: Public School Classrooms and a 
Return to the Supreme Court’s Vision for Viewpoint-Specific Speech Regulation Policy, 16 
RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 529, 531 (2013).  
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student’s banner and suspend the student on the basis of the student’s speech 
content.41  In that case, the Court decided that the student’s banner, which 
read “BONG HiTS [sic] 4 JESUS,” promotes illegal drug use,42 and therefore 
is not protected speech.43  In his opinion, Justice Roberts compared the facts 
of the case to those in Fraser, noting that if the speech in that case had 
occurred “outside the school context, it would have been protected.”44  The 
Court also expressed uncertainty regarding schools’ boundaries and student 
speech,45 marking the closest it has come to deciding how far a public school 
can reach student speech off-campus. 
B. Free Speech and Public Universities 
As of 2013, no court had applied Fraser or Morse to the university 
student context; furthermore, no court had decided whether extracurricular 
university student speech off-campus can be restricted.46  In Ward v. Polite, 
a student seeking a master’s degree in counseling was expelled from her 
program because she had asked to refer her gay and lesbian clients to other 
counselors, in violation of the American Counseling Association’s code of 
ethics.47  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a school’s curriculum 
itself is protected speech, and that regardless of the age of the student, the 
Hazelwood standard applies.48  It also decided in Ward that the university 
has a right to adopt anti-discrimination policies.49  Ward sits at the 
intersection of religious rights, discrimination, and free speech, which this 
Comment does not seek to resolve.  Nevertheless, Ward provides an 
interesting glimpse into how courts treat student speech within a curricular 
setting (“on-campus”). 
In the Supreme Court’s 1972 Healy v. James decision, a public 
university was held to have unconstitutionally infringed students’ rights to 
free speech when the school refused to recognize a student group.50  This is 
an important case for public universities and on-campus extracurricular 
speech.51  In the spirit of Tinker, Healy went a step further to explain that 
 
 41  551 U.S. 393, 397.  
 42  Id. at 397, 401–02. 
 43  Id. at 408. 
 44  Id. at 405. 
 45  Id. at 401 (“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should 
apply school speech precedents.”). 
 46  Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification 
Cases, 11 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 382, 388 (2013). 
 47  667 F.3d 727, 731–32 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 48  Id. at 733 (“The key word is student.”). 
 49  Id. at 738–39. 
 50  408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972). 
 51  Id. at 171. 
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“state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of 
the First Amendment.”52  The holding in Healy supports an argument against 
an orthodoxy of opinions on college campuses.53 
C. When Student Speech Takes a Hike Off-Campus 
Some judges and scholars nevertheless distinguish the holding in 
Hazelwood, which addressed high school speech, from the rights afforded to 
students at universities and post-graduate programs.54  For example, 
Hazelwood has been applied to public professional school students’ speech 
off-campus, which can be problematic and far-reaching when discussing 
post-graduate student speech in public universities.55  Courts have also 
looked to the Tinker standard to evaluate whether the off-campus speech 
caused or could cause a potential disruption to the learning environment.56  
Some courts have explicitly not decided the issue of whether Tinker and its 
progeny apply to off-campus speech.57 
In 2016, a federal district court held that a public high school did not 
infringe a student’s First Amendment rights when the school suspended that 
student for having posted bomb threats on his Facebook page.58  The judge, 
pointing to Tinker, opined that it was not the location of the speech that 
 
 52  Id. at 180. 
 53  Id. (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas.’”). 
 54  Keefe, 840 F.3d at 542 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Hazelwood because 
“Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be reasonably 
attributed to the school”); McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he teachings of . . . decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools[] 
cannot be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities.  Any application of free 
speech doctrine derived from these decisions to the university setting should be scrutinized 
carefully.”).  See, e.g., Wahrmann-Harry, supra note 15, at 445–46. 
 55  See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012) (“Applying the 
[Hazelwood] legitimate pedagogical concerns standard to a professional student’s Facebook 
posts would give universities wide-ranging authority to constrain offensive or controversial 
Internet activity by requiring only that a school’s actions be ‘reasonably related’ to ‘legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.’”) (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73).  But see Keefe, 840 F.3d at 
531 (“College administrators and educators in a professional school have discretion to require 
compliance with recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus, ‘so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”) (citing Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 273). 
 56  E.g., Keefe, 840 F.3d at 531 n.6 (“Tinker permits disciplining public school students 
for off-campus postings ‘where it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the 
school community and cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting.’”) (citing 
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
 57  See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 303 n.9 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011)) (“We have not yet 
decided whether Tinker is limited to on-campus speech.”). 
 58  R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 640 (2016). 
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mattered, but rather that the speech would cause a substantial disruption.59 
In contrast, the Third Circuit in 2011 decided that an eighth-grader did 
not cause a substantial disruption when she made fun of her school’s 
principal on her MySpace page, and that the school infringed her First 
Amendment rights when it suspended her.60  The court here explicitly stated 
that “Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.”61 
In 2011, the Third Circuit went further to support a public school 
student’s right to free speech off-campus.62  It held en banc in Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District that a high school senior should not have been 
disciplined for posting a “parody profile” of the school principal on 
MySpace.63  The student had accessed the profile at times from within the 
classroom.64  The school alleged that the student’s speech was defamatory 
and began on campus, and that therefore the school district was justified in 
regulating the student’s conduct.65  Regardless, there was no allegation of 
substantial disruption (the Tinker standard) caused by the student’s MySpace 
activity.66 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in 2013’s Wynar v. 
Douglas County School District that even though a high school student’s off-
campus speech (instant messages on MySpace) met the Tinker standard to 
be constitutionally protected, the school was justified in temporarily 
expelling67 the student for making an identifiable threat of violence toward 
the school (school shooting).68  This case is distinguishable because it would 
likely be considered a true threat and therefore not protected speech under 
the First Amendment.69 
Similar to the circumstances surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Wynar, in 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a public high 
school’s discipline of a student who had recorded a rap song (off-campus 
speech) containing language that described violent acts against school 
teacher-coaches.70  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the speech was 
 
 59  Id. 
 60  J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 61  Id. at 932. 
 62  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 63  Id. at 219. 
 64  Id. at 209. 
 65  Id. at 214.   
 66  Id. 
 67  The school board expelled the student for ninety days.  Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 68  Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1062. 
 69  See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 70  Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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“threatening, harassing, and intimidating,” it could cause a reasonable 
expectation on the part of the faculty that there would be a substantial 
disruption.71 
As this Comment examines infra in addressing Tatro, Keefe, and 
Oyama, various courts’ applications of the Tinker “substantial disruption” 
standard are inconsistent and should be irrelevant to graduate student speech 
off-campus.  Tinker is for pure speech on-campus and in the K-12 context. 
D. Free Speech and the “Professional Program” Student 
Defining a “professional program” presents its own set of challenges 
for a court.  One way to define it would be for a court to consider 
“professional” programs to be “situations where students are performing 
duties otherwise performed by professionals, under professional supervision.  
For example, law school clinics, where students are dealing with clients; or 
medical school rotations; or student teaching; or . . . interacting with 
cadavers.”72  This approach fails to address the on-campus/off-campus 
distinction as outlined in Morse v. Frederick,73 and leaves the university able 
to reach into most aspects of students’ lives before they have attained 
professional status. 
The Court should define this “professional” capacity as narrowly as 
possible, including only those professions for which the state has agreed to 
confer statutory licensing requirements.  This would provide protection for 
student journalists, for example, and other non-licensed professions.74 
Through various circuit court decisions, the university’s right to impose 
professionalism requirements on its students has been consistently upheld.75  
Courts characterize the decision on the part of the university to be academic, 
not disciplinary.76  Most cases here do not involve free speech, and are within 
the world of what should properly be considered curricular conduct, not 
protected speech off-campus.77  Courts typically defer to the judgment of the 
university when finding that a student lacked professionalism in the 
 
 71  Id. at 383. 
 72  Will Creeley, A Closer Look at Tatro v. Minnesota, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN 
EDUC. (FIRE) (June 22, 2012), https://www.thefire.org/a-closer-look-at-tatro-v-university-of-
minnesota/. 
 73  551 U.S. 393. 
 74  See infra, Part IV, critique of Calvert’s “Essentiality Principle” prong. 
 75  See Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016); Al-Dabagh v. Case W. 
Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 2015).  See also Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 
F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 76  See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 (1978); Al-Dabagh, 
777 F.3d at 360 (“The Committee’s professionalism determination is an academic 
judgment.”). 
 77  See, e.g., Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 359–60. 
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curricular context (on-campus): “[j]udges are ‘ill-equipped’ to second-guess 
the University’s curricular choices.”78 
The Supreme Court has also urged deference to the public university’s 
academic decisions, restating its “responsibility to safeguard their academic 
freedom, ‘a special concern of the First Amendment.’”79  Academic 
evaluation should not extend to student speech made in a private capacity 
off-campus, which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. 
1. Amanda Tatro: Worthy of Discipline, Protection, or 
Both? 
A Minnesota Supreme Court case from 2012 examined the tension 
between professional conduct standards and First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  In Tatro v. University of Minnesota, the court evaluated a 
mortuary science student’s Facebook comments and found them to be 
disrespectful in light of a state statute outlining established standards of 
professional conduct for that industry.80  Mortuary student Amanda Tatro’s 
Facebook comments, labeled potentially violent by some,81 referred to a 
cadaver in her anatomy lab as “Bernie,” presumably as a reference to the 
movie “Weekend at Bernie’s.”82  Tatro posted to her “friends” and “friends 
of friends,”83 “[g]ive me room, lots of aggression to be taken out with a 
trocar.”84  Tatro testified that a “death list” mentioned in one of her Facebook 
posts was a reference to the movie “Kill Bill”85: “Who knew embalming lab 
was so cathartic!  I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a 
trocar though.  Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the evening updating my 
‘Death List #5’.”86  Equally troubling in light of her own death shortly after 
the case was decided,87 she posted: “I wish to accompany [the cadaver] to 
 
 78  Id. at 359 (quoting Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 
1988)). 
 79  Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (quoting Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 80  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012). 
 81  Andrew Beaujon, Amanda Tatro Dead at 31; Challenged University’s Facebook 
Policies on First Amendment Grounds, POYNTER (June 26, 2012), 
https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2012/amanda-tatro-challenged-universitys-
facebook-policies-on-first-amendment-grounds/ 
 82  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512. 
 83  Tatro v. University of Minnesota, ACLU MINNESOTA, https://www.aclu-
mn.org/en/cases/tatro-v-university-minnesota (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 84  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512.  A trocar is “a sharp-pointed surgical instrument fitted with 
a cannula and used especially to insert the cannula into a body cavity as a drainage outlet.”  
Trocar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trocar (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
 85  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 513. 
 86  Id. at 512. 
 87  Tatro died about a week after her case was decided; the cause of death could not be 
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the retort.  Now where will I go or who will I hang with when I need to gather 
my sanity?”88 
In Tatro, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the university’s rules 
were “narrowly tailored” and “directly related to established professional 
conduct standards,” which permitted the university to sanction Tatro for her 
Facebook statements.89  Tatro, however, argued that the university’s 
disciplinary measures would chill student speech beyond their studies—that 
the university “cannot impose a broad rule that would prohibit mortuary 
science students from criticizing faculty members or posting offensive 
statements that are unrelated to the study of human cadavers.”90 
Indeed, the case underscores the importance of crafting a narrow rule 
that does not chill student speech91 so much that students are unable to learn 
effectively92—or, hypothetically, to seek assistance or guidance93—within 
the university program.  Students would be less likely to report misconduct 
among their peers or professors if they perceive it to be potentially career-
altering.  “If speech loses its First Amendment protection because it causes 
so many grantors to withdraw their support that a program’s viability is 
threatened . . . then no student may ever feel safe, in any venue, blowing the 
whistle on wrongdoing.”94 
 
confirmed.  She was physically disabled and had a central nervous system disorder.  Emily 
Gurnon, Amanda Tatro Dies; University of Minnesota Student Challenged U’s Facebook 
Policies, PIONEER PRESS (last updated Nov. 10, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.twincities.com 
/2012/06/25/amanda-tatro-dies-university-of-minnesota-student-challenged-us-facebook-
policies/.  Tatro had planned to seek further review of the case.  Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota, ACLU MINNESOTA, https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/tatro-v-university-
minnesota (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 88  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 512. 
 89  Id. at 523. 
 90  Id. at 521. 
 91  See Thomas Healy, Who’s Afraid of Free Speech?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 
COLUM. U. (July 14, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/news/whos-afraid-free-speech (“One 
of the reasons government censorship is so troubling is that the coercive power of the state is 
nearly impossible to resist, making its chilling effect not just real but profound.”).  
 92  See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive 
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 416 (2011) (“If schools start policing and punishing off-
campus speech, students’ views of schools, teachers, and administrators may be altered in a 
manner that interferes with the learning process itself.”). 
 93  Cf. Eugene Volokh, Okay to Dismiss Professional School Students for Expressing 
‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with Standards Set by’ Government Authorities, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp 
/2015/12/29/okay-to-dismiss-professional-school-students-for-expressing-views-deemed-
not-in-alignment-with-standards-set-by-government-authorities/.  Volokh points to the “chill 
created by such decisions,” which will cause students to refrain from expressing views that 
are “misguided.”  Id.  Students could similarly be chilled from expressing views that would 
evoke an educator’s natural concern for the student’s well-being.   
 94  Frank D. LoMonte, Free Speech Off-Campus Must Be Protected, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Feb. 5, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Free-Speech-Off-Campus-Must-
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Of course, professional organizations could argue they have a 
compelling interest against students making such comments in the course of 
their studies.  On behalf of the university in Tatro, the American Board of 
Funeral Service Education (ABFSE) argued in its amicus brief that the 
university must protect the integrity of “willed body programs,” or “whole 
body donations.”95  The implication is that donors or their next of kin would 
be less willing to participate in the programs if mortuary students are 
permitted to express such statements about cadavers in anatomy labs.96  
Willed body programs are largely unregulated and therefore susceptible to 
“governmental investigations, donor scrutiny, and a diminishing supply.”97  
Regardless, the governmental interest in ensuring a supply of whole body 
donations should not outweigh the student’s First Amendment right to free 
speech off-campus, in a non-curricular environment.  The Tatro court failed 
to balance the burden it places on student speech off-campus against the 
harm it might have caused the university’s educational mission for students 
to engage in disrespectful speech.98 
Although some of Tatro’s comments could be seen as troubling or even 
vaguely threatening, equally troubling is a “mini-trend” for state actors to 
blur the already-thin line between social media rant posts and true threats.99  
Allowing students to speak freely off-campus and beyond the curriculum 
would not prevent the university or legislature from enacting standards to 
ensure confidentiality, nor would it prevent inquiry into speech that is 
already not constitutionally protected. 
In a positive development for professional-level students, the court in 
Tatro declined to evaluate the case under the Tinker standard, 
acknowledging that the statements were made on Facebook and could not be 
considered substantially disruptive to the curricular environment.100  The 
Fifth Circuit, in contrast, was willing to extend the Tinker “substantial 
 
Be/130660. 
 95  Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Council on Education and the Association of 
American Medical Colleges at 14, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) 
(No. A10-1440), https://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/Amicus-Brief-in-Support-
of-the-University-of-Minnesota-in-Tatro-v-UMN.pdf. 
 96  See id. at 15. 
 97  Allison Slocum, Note, Dearly Departed, Dearly Needed, 24 ELDER L.J. 181, 182 
(2016). 
 98  Joint Brief of Amici Curiae Student Press Law Center and Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education, Inc., at 14, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (No. 
A10-1440), http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/briefs/pdfs/a101440scac1.pdf (stating that the 
impact is “simply too attenuated—and . . . would invite too much abuse”). 
 99  Eric Goldman, Mortuary Sciences College Student Disciplined for Threatening 
Facebook Posts—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 12, 
2011), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/07/mortuary_scienc.htm. 
 100  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Minn. 2012). 
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disruption” standard to off-campus speech when dealing with a high school 
student.101  The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to do so here, however, 
when dealing with a professional program student.102 
Although the court in Tatro declined to apply the Tinker standard, it 
invoked the “special characteristics of the academic environment” in 
deciding that the university was permitted to discipline Amanda Tatro for 
her statements.103  This analysis defers to the university’s contention that it 
should be permitted to establish program rules that demand “respect, 
discretion, and confidentiality” when dealing with willed cadavers.104  It 
bears noting that ABFSE does not appear to have stated in its rules that 
“respect, discretion, and confidentiality” are required, nor did it explain these 
terms.105  The court in Tatro held that the school’s policy could 
constitutionally restrict student speech off-campus as long as the policy is 
“narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct 
standards.”106 
This case opens the door for a public university to discipline a student 
for any speech off-campus that it deems violative of “any claimed 
curriculum-based reason.”107  This decision is binding only on the state level, 
because it is a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.  Nevertheless, a 
state supreme court opinion could be persuasive authority to the Supreme 
Court when it will inevitably face a similar fact pattern.  A Supreme Court 
decision on the issue would clarify this open question.  The Court should 
make clear that graduate student speech off-campus deserves wide 
constitutional protection, especially when it cannot reasonably be argued that 
the speech is “substantially disruptive,” per the Tinker standard,108 nor can it 
be argued that professional students’ speech off-campus does not merit the 
protections in line with the Court’s dicta in Morse v. Frederick.109  
Furthermore, the age and maturity of professional students bears additional 
consideration—Tinker, Hazelwood, and Morse all dealt with the K-12 
 
 101  Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 102  Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519. 
 103  Id. at 520. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. (stating that the mortuary program’s rules required “respect, discretion, and 
confidentiality”). 
 106  Id. at 521. 
 107  Id. 
 108  “The free speech rules in this area are pretty vague and can turn on subtle factual 
differences.”  Eugene Volokh, Teacher Disciplined for “Bullying” Student Who Had Put Up 
a Swastika, REASON.COM (Oct. 22, 2018, 8:14 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/22/ 
teacher-disciplined-for-bullying-student (discussing whether a student’s posting of a swastika 
on a “Spirit Wall” was constitutionally protected; stating that it’s possible the violation could 
be “seen as disruptive enough to the school’s mission to be constitutionally unprotected”). 
 109  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401, 405 (2007). 
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atmosphere. 
2. Oyama’s Ejection for Curricular Speech 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drew criticism from free speech 
advocates with its 2015 decision in Oyama v. University of Hawaii.110  
Oyama, who sought student teacher certification, wrote in a reflection paper 
as part of his curricular work that he believed “online child predation should 
be legal” and that “the age of consent should be either 0, or whatever age a 
child is when puberty begins.”111 
Although the decision to expel Oyama from the program can be 
distinguished from the decision in Tatro because Oyama’s comments were 
made in the course of academic curriculum (“on campus”), this decision is 
pertinent to off-campus student speech in the professional program context 
because of the Ninth Circuit’s precedent-setting three-pronged test for 
evaluating whether a public university violates the First Amendment rights 
of its students in the professional program context.112  The professional 
standard is a constitutional restraint, according to the court, if it is: (1) 
“directly related to defined and established professional standards”;113 (2) 
narrowly tailored;114 and (3) employs “reasonable professional judgment.”115  
In Oyama, the court found that the student’s speech was directly related to 
defined and established professional standards and was narrowly tailored to 
serve the university’s educational mission.116  This places Oyama more in 
line with circuit court decisions that urge deference to the university’s 
determination of professionalism within the academic curricular setting.117 
This decision causes a problem for cases involving student speech in 
professional programs because it allows the university to make decisions 
regarding whether the student’s speech fits within the orthodoxy of 
established academic standards.  A potential unforeseen downside to this 
would be that it could keep students from expressing contrarian views within 
their academic setting.  For example, sanctions against students can 
encourage viewpoint discrimination by empowering universities to quiet 
 
 110  Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015).  Susan Kruth, Ninth Circuit 
Cites ‘Professional Standards’ in Allowing University to Punish Student Speech, FOUND. FOR 
INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE) (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/ninth-circuit-
cites-professional-standards-in-allowing-university-to-punish-student-speech/.  
 111  Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856. 
 112  Id. at 868.  The court drew these prongs from student speech and employee speech 
doctrines.  Id. 
 113  Id. at 868. 
 114  Id. at 871. 
 115  Id. at 872. 
 116  Id. at 855. 
 117  See, e.g., Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Res. Univ., 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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students who express unpopular opinions but who have no other academic 
performance problems.118 
3. Keefe and “behavior unbecoming” of a nursing student 
The most recent federal case to examine off-campus speech in the 
professional program context is the Eighth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Keefe 
v. Adams.119  Student Craig Keefe was removed from Minnesota’s Central 
Lakes College nursing program for “behavior unbecoming of the profession 
and transgression of professional boundaries” through his Facebook posts.120  
On his Facebook page, Keefe had posted: “Doesnt [sic] anyone know or have 
heard of mechanical pencils.  Im [sic] going to take this electric pencil 
sharpener in this class and give someone a hemopneumothorax [a trauma 
where the lung is punctured] with it before to [sic] long.  I might need some 
anger management.”121  Keefe also directed a public post at a classmate 
specifically: 
LMAO [sic] [a classmate], you keep reporting my post and get me 
banded [sic].  I don’t really care.  If thats [sic] the smartest thing 
you can come up with than I completely understand why your [sic] 
going to fail out of the RN program you stupid bitchFalseAnd 
quite [sic] creeping on my page.  Your [sic] not a friend of mine 
for a reason.  If you don’t like what I have to say than [sic] don’t 
come and ask me, thats [sic] basically what creeping is isn’t it. 
Stay off my page . . .122 
The Eighth Circuit said Keefe violated Central Lakes College’s student 
ethics code, which includes an ethical standard prohibiting “behavior 
unbecoming of the Nursing Profession.”123  The school’s director of nursing 
testified that she felt she could not teach Keefe, and that he would not be able 
to attain the level of professionalism required.124  She testified that she 
“understood his [First Amendment] rights but this was about 
professionalism.”125  The Eighth Circuit also said Keefe violated the Nurses 
Association Code of Ethics, which integrates “personal and professional 
identities.”126  This causes a disturbing lack of regard for a student’s right to 
 
 118  Ari Cohn, FIRE and Student Press Law Center File Brief in ‘Oyama v. University of 
Hawaii’, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE) (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.thefire 
.org/fire-and-student-press-law-center-file-brief-in-oyama-v-university-of-hawaii/. 
 119  Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1448 (2017).  
 120  Id. at 525. 
 121  Id. at 527. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. at 528. 
 124  Id. at 527. 
 125  Keefe, 840 F.3d at 527.  
 126  Id. at 529. 
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free speech off-campus.  Also troubling, the Eighth Circuit in Keefe melded 
the Tinker and Hazelwood standards, holding that speech that does not 
comply with professional standards, regardless of whether that speech is on- 
or off-campus, necessarily “materially disrupts” the school’s “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”127 
It bears repeating that Keefe involved an adult student in a professional 
nursing program, whereas Tinker and Hazelwood involved public high 
school, on-campus free speech, and thus “are not the appropriate standards 
for evaluating whether a university may regulate a student’s off-campus 
speech that is non-school-sponsored and unrelated to academic activities.”128  
Judge Kelly’s dissent in Keefe focused on this distinction, stating that 
Hazelwood “does not allow retaliation against disfavored speech that occurs 
outside the classroom.”129  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit erred in 
comparing Keefe to Ward v. Polite.130  The latter involved a student refusing 
to treat patients based on that student’s religious objections to the patients’ 
sexual orientation.131  The two cases are factually incongruous; Keefe was 
not dealing in a professional capacity in his Facebook posts.  Courts must 
not look to the standards set forth in Tinker and Hazelwood but must treat 
students in professional university programs as mature adults who are not in 
need of the same paternalistic stance. 
The distinction between professional speech and private speech is a 
special concern when dealing with adults who are students, but who are not 
yet considered members of a profession.  Daniel Halberstam and Robert 
Post, both constitutional law scholars, distinguish professional speech, 
defined as “‘speech . . . uttered in the course of professional practice,’ as 
distinct from ‘speech . . . uttered by a professional.’”132  This separation of 
identity, if applied to professional students’ speech off-campus, would 
provide much-needed breathing room for the student while preserving 
oversight for situations such as Ward v. Polite,133 where a professional 
student is acting in a professional, curricular capacity.  It could also prompt 
a court to re-examine its reasoning in Keefe and more fittingly decide that 
Keefe’s comments on his Facebook page were substantially disruptive, or 
that they could have constituted true threats. 
 
 127  Id. at 531. 
 128  Wahrmann-Harry, supra note 15, at 445–46.  
 129  Keefe, 840 F.3d at 542 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 
F.3d 865, 882 (11th Cir. 2011) (Pryor, J., concurring)). 
 130  See id. at 532. 
 131  Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 132  Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1253 (2016) (citing Robert 
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician 
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007)). 
 133  See discussion of Ward v. Polite, supra Part II.B. 
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III. “LEGITIMATE PEDAGOGICAL CONCERN” AND THE ROLE OF THE 
UNIVERSITY IN ENFORCING PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
Because Hazelwood does not properly apply to off-campus graduate/
professional student speech, a crucial part of our analysis is to deconstruct 
the rationale behind the precedent that a professional standard must be 
related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”134  Defining “legitimate 
pedagogical concern,” although a vague standard to begin with, is more 
straightforward when in the K-12 context.  It becomes a more philosophical 
question when dealing with adults in the professional/graduate public 
university setting.  As the Third Circuit held in 2010, “[c]onsiderations of 
maturity are not nearly as important for university students, most of whom 
are already over the age of 18 and entrusted with a panoply of rights and 
responsibilities as legal adults.”135 
If the purpose (or “legitimate pedagogical concern”) of the university 
is to protect its students’ future career prospects, we must evaluate the in loco 
parentis doctrine.  From the mid-1800s until the 1960s, universities were 
generally permitted to act “in the place of a parent” toward their students, 
which meant that a student’s constitutional rights were “stopped at the 
college gates.”136  This came to an end around 1961, with the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, where nine African 
American students were expelled from Alabama State College without 
notice or a hearing.137  This was a due process case in which the students had 
been expelled for violating a state law that racially segregated lunch 
counters.138  The court decided that an academic hearing was necessary 
“prior to expulsion from a state college or university.”139  Thus, disciplinary 
hearings as a result of a professional student’s off-campus speech may face 
review under the court’s procedural due process standard.140 
The professional student’s free speech rights do not end at the gates of 
the public university.  Although professional students’ off-campus speech 
deserves robust protection by the Court, universities and law enforcement 
officials’ ability to discipline students based on unprotected speech should 
remain untouched, with those statements falling into traditional categories 
 
 134  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 135  McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 136  Philip Lee, The Curious Life of In Loco Parentis in American Universities, 8 HIGHER 
EDUC. IN REV. 65, 67 (2011). 
 137  Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1961).   
 138  Id. at 153. 
 139  Id. at 158. 
 140  See Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 534–35 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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such as fighting words141 or true threats.142  Harassment, for example, could 
be ripe for litigation in a public university setting,143 and is a more fitting 
rubric for analysis in the case of Keefe. 
Some argue that where there is no legitimate pedagogical concern, 
schools “may not stop speech, even in a nonpublic forum.”144  Many of the 
public school speech cases invoke the rationale that the university may 
restrict speech because it bears the imprimatur of the school itself via 
professional certification.145  This may be justifiable in the context of 
curricular speech, as in Oyama’s student teaching program.  In contrast, in 
the context of noncurricular speech, universities should not be granted vast 
deference—especially when off-campus speech is unrelated to the 
professional curriculum, is not undertaken as part of the student’s role in 
providing services, and bears no imprimatur of the school itself.  Statutory 
certification schemes, such as the regulation in Tatro, do not absolve the 
university of its responsibility to uphold the First Amendment as a state 
actor. 
The role of the university is to educate, and the institution is a state 
actor bound to protect constitutional rights.  This constitutional 
responsibility must outweigh the university’s compelling interest in 
producing a commodity attractive for gainful employment.  The “legitimate 
pedagogical concern” analysis must necessarily be narrowed to exclude the 
off-campus speech of mature students in professional programs who are not 
yet licensed professionals.  The decision whether to certify a graduate student 
for entrance to a profession properly lies with the professional body, not with 
the university (as a state actor that is bound to uphold the Constitution). 
For example, although requirements for admission to law practice vary 
by state, it’s possible for U.S. law students to attain a professional degree 
(juris doctor, or JD), but nevertheless fail to pass a state’s bar examination, 
or fail to pass a state’s moral character requirement, thus attaining a law 
degree but failing to attain professional licensure.146  For the purposes of 
sanctioning attorneys once they have been licensed, “the disciplinary body 
 
 141  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 142  See e.g, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 143  Ana Vieira Ayala, Hate Speech is Free Speech but Free Speech is Not Absolute: A 
Look at the First Amendment and College Campuses, 81 TEX. B.J. 330, 330–31 (2018). 
 144  Jeff Sklar, Note, The Presses Won’t Stop Just Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in 
the Wake of Hazelwood’s Application to Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 683 (2007). 
 145  See Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The 
Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013). 
 146  See Admission to the Bar in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wi 
ki/Admission_to_practice_law#United_States (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
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bears the burden of proving falsity [of statements].”147 
IV. CALVERT’S FOUR-PRONGED TEST AND UNFORESEEN OUTCOMES 
First Amendment scholar and journalism professor Clay Calvert148 
proposed a test which seeks to resolve cases dealing with free speech and 
professional certification.149  Under the four prongs of Calvert’s suggested 
test, a court must ensure that a public university’s enforcement of a 
professional standard does not violate a student’s right to free speech by 
evaluating the standard for its (1) precision; (2) essentiality; (3) 
contextuality; and (4) proportionality.150 
Calvert’s Precision Principle, the first prong of his test, requires that the 
professional standard must be (1) codified by statute, or carry the imprimatur 
of a professional interest group, and (2) survive a facial challenge for 
vagueness.151  This prong hinges on how vague the professional standard is, 
and what a court would subjectively consider vague.152  A statute can survive 
a challenge for vagueness and still be too subjective.  For example, recall 
that in Keefe, the student was removed from the nursing program for a lack 
of professionalism.153  The court called the nursing program’s professional 
standards “necessarily quite general, but they are widely recognized and 
followed.”154  It would not be a stretch to imagine a scenario where a court 
would move the line between “vague” and “general” based on the subjective 
perception of a university official who might disagree with a student’s 
politically unpopular opinions. 
Calvert’s Precision Principle could push the Keefe finding into 
unconstitutional territory by virtue of the standards being too vague.  Placing 
such a determination in the hands of the Court could allow a university to 
have unfettered reach into a student’s speech off-campus.  Regardless, the 
university, as a state actor, should not be in the position of enforcing a 
standard that is too vague and that infringes constitutional rights.  In 
situations such as those involving a student’s expression off-campus, as in 
Keefe and Tatro, the Court would do well to consider the student’s “taste and 
style,” as described in its decision in Cohen v. California: “[O]ne man’s 
 
 147  Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 
(9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 148  JD, PhD, https://www.jou.ufl.edu/staff/clay-calvert/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 149  Calvert, supra note 9, at 648. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Id.  
 152  See Calvert, supra note 9, at 650. 
 153  Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 2016) (Keefe was removed from the 
nursing program “for behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of 
professional boundaries.”). 
 154  Id. at 532. 
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vulgarity is another’s lyric.  Indeed, we think it is largely because 
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that 
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the 
individual.”155 
Calvert’s Essentiality Principle, the second prong of his four-pronged 
test, calls for the Court to require that compliance with the professional 
standard be essential to the student’s “professional success following 
graduation.”156  This prong would place the Court in the position of deciding 
whether it would be necessary for a student to adhere to a professional 
standard in order to attain professional success post-graduation.157  The Court 
would decide this by deferring to the university, which could impede the 
Court from adjudicating a constitutional matter.  Furthermore, it raises the 
specter of student as commodity, which necessarily forces the Court to 
choose whether the university’s role (or, legitimate pedagogical concern) is 
to educate students, or to produce students that are employable.  Professional 
success could easily be defined so broadly as to restrict other constitutionally 
protected speech off-campus.  The Court must scrutinize all professional 
licensing standards to ensure that students’ right to free speech off-campus 
is not infringed. 
Calvert’s Contextuality Principle, the third of his four-prong test, 
requires that “[i]mposition of the professional standard . . . not place an 
undue burden on the free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional 
contexts and nonacademic settings . . . .”158  This principle should be further 
refined along the lines of cases that distinguish student speech on-campus 
and off-campus.  For example, the test could make clear that while student 
speech in the curricular context can be restricted in line with the holdings in 
Hazelwood and Oyama, student speech that occurs in an off-campus forum 
and that bears no imprimatur of the school, such as with Keefe and Tatro, 
should not be restricted by the university.  Other than speech that is not 
protected by the First Amendment, the Court should not place any burden on 
the free-speech rights of the student in nonprofessional contexts and 
nonacademic settings.  Providing for a balancing test allows the university 
to reach too far into the off-campus context.  Free speech “balancing tests” 
can be considered “free speech consequentialism,” where harms to one 
interest must be weighed against another.159  This balancing necessarily 
imparts a subjective determination on the part of the Court, “undermin[ing] 
strong free speech protections” and threatening the neutrality guarantee of 
 
 155  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 156  Calvert, supra note 9, at 651. 
 157  Id.  
 158  Calvert, supra note 9, at 648. 
 159  Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016). 
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the First Amendment.160 
Calvert’s Proportionality Principle, the final prong of his test, calls for 
a measured disciplinary response to students’ violation of the professional 
standard.  In order to pass constitutional muster, the university’s sanction 
against a student must be “narrowly limited,” or, if the student is expelled 
from the program, the student must have been a repeat offender who ignores 
warnings and “is unwilling or unable to uphold the standard.”161  It is unclear 
which cases or precedent suggest that this would be an adequate measure to 
educate the student.  For example, Calvert begins by pointing to the fact that 
Amanda Tatro was permitted to continue in her mortuary program “with a 
failing grade in one laboratory course.”162  Calvert then points to evidentiary 
levels of proof and an examination of deference to the university for how a 
restriction on student speech might be constitutional.163  The wide deference 
granted to the university in cases such as Tatro and Keefe show a strong trend 
toward deference to the university that could create wide opportunity for 
student speech to be curtailed, especially in situations where a university 
could argue that its legitimate pedagogical interest is in orthodoxy of ideas. 
Calvert’s test is an improvement over the current uncertain state of how 
courts evaluate these cases.  However, although it is based off the three 
prongs set forth for curricular student speech in Oyama,164 Calvert’s four-
pronged test fails to distinguish the fact that Oyama, unlike the students in 
Tatro and Keefe, sought certification for employment in a public institution 
(to teach in public schools).165  It is understandably alarming for a candidate 
seeking to teach children to advocate for the legalization of child predation, 
as Oyama did in his coursework.166  The Ninth Circuit in Oyama recognized 
that the public employee free speech doctrine addresses this concern167 by 
allowing vast deference to the judgment of the government employer.168  
 
 160  Id. 
 161  Calvert, supra note 9, at 648. 
 162  Calvert, supra note 9, at 655 n. 293 (citing Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 
524 (Minn. 2012)). 
 163  Calvert, supra note 9, at 655. 
 164  Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 868–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a 
disciplinary decision must be based on well-established professional standards, must be 
narrowly tailored to further the school’s educational mission, and must reflect reasonable 
professional judgment). 
 165  See id. at 860 (“Oyama’s claim defies easy categorization because his position at the 
University combined the characteristics of both a student and a public employee.”). 
 166  Id. at 856. 
 167  Id. at 865 (“[T]he University may constitutionally evaluate or restrict the candidate’s 
speech to fulfill its responsibilities to the public and to achieve its institutional objectives.”). 
 168  Government Employees and First Amendment Overview, FREEDOM FORUM INST. (Apr. 
24, 2017), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-
of-speech-2/free-speech-and-government-employees-overview/. 
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Calvert suggests that if Oyama had advocated the same positions off campus, 
the court would not have allowed the university to restrict his statements.169  
Nevertheless, the Oyama court’s deference to the “professional standard” 
could justify greater reach into a student’s speech, regardless of its setting—
an outcome not without its own potential downside.170 
Professor Clay Calvert has suggested a workable test for professional 
certification cases involving student speech.  However, it does not 
adequately account for the distinction between on-campus and off-campus 
speech.  The Supreme Court in Hazelwood made clear that schools have a 
compelling interest in controlling student speech off-campus, provided it can 
be considered “curricular”—if it bears the imprimatur of the school.171  
Calvert’s test would be more effective in preserving students’ free speech 
rights if it declared their noncurricular speech off-campus generally off 
limits.  Existing laws against harassment, true threats, and fighting words 
could adequately address many of these concerns without infringing on 
students’ rights to free speech.172 
V. CONCLUSION 
As an educational institution, the university has an interest in teaching 
its students what the licensing body or professional standard will be upon 
graduation.  The university may caution its students that they are at risk of 
not being able to obtain employment or certification.  But expulsion (or 
discipline that results in failure from the program) for off-campus non-
curricular speech infringes students’ constitutional rights. 
The university should be in the role of educator, notifying students that 
their off-campus conduct would not be acceptable under professional 
guidelines and could reduce their chances of attaining employment once they 
graduate. 
The Supreme Court should clarify this area and urge universities to step 
 
 169  Calvert, supra note 9, at 643–45.  
 170  But see Eugene Volokh, Opinion (The Volokh Conspiracy), Okay to Dismiss 
Professional School Students for Expressing ‘Views . . . Deemed Not in Alignment with 
Standards Set by’ Government Authorities, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/29/okay-to-dismiss-
professional-school-students-for-expressing-views-deemed-not-in-alignment-with-
standards-set-by-government-authorities/ (“[D]espite the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to impose 
some limits on its ‘professional standards’ rationale, this sort of analysis is poison to academic 
freedom. . . .  [T]he court’s rationale could let universities suppress a vast range of student 
speech.”). 
 171  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (explaining that 
educators are entitled to control student expression that “members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school”). 
 172  Trego, supra note 14, at 119 (“[P]rofessional students should continue to be held to 
the same free speech exceptions as the public, including restrictions on true threats.”).  
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out of the role of certification gatekeeper, keeping them properly in the role 
of education provider.  This would afford students the opportunity to learn 
and be responsible for their own careers. 
 
